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The Formal Cause in the Posterior Analytics
In the Posterior Analytics (APo) Aristotle discusses scientific demonstrations, 
which are syllogistic proofs of a scientific law or theorem, and identifies the 
cause of a scientific fact. It is unclear in the current literature how this is related 
to Aristotle’s four causes. In this paper I argue for the unorthodox view that the 
APo is centred upon formal causation. Formal cause is here understood differ-
ently from the typical hylomorphic account that Aristotle gives in De Anima, 
Physics, and Metaphysics, where form is fundamentally understood in opposi-
tion to matter. Aristotle does not make use of the distinction between form and 
matter in APo, thereby presenting a much more subject-neutral theory. In APo 
formal cause is rather understood in a more innocent sense, namely as a kind 
such that everything that is of that kind has a certain property; irrespective of 
whether it is a kind of material (bronze) or substance (man).1 For those readers 
who object to this use of the term “formal cause”, feel free to replace it with “ex-
planation by what it is (τί ἐστι)” or “explanation by essence”.2
Although there are also discussions of the other causes, especially efficient 
causation, my argument is that Aristotle first and foremost has formal causation 
in view in his discussion. While this is an unorthodox view today, it once used to 
be the orthodox view (e.g., Ross 1949). And there is a recent, though still margin-
al, trend in favour of this view.3 However, due to limited space I will not engage 
much with competing interpretations.
1 Ferejohn (2013) similarly applies the term formal cause. Ferejohn further argues that Aris-
totle’s account of form in APo represents an early part of his development, later rejected in 
favour of a hylomorphic account. I criticize Ferejohn’s developmental account in Sandstad 
(forthcoming).
2 Thanks to Robert Bolton & James G. Lennox for pressing me on this point.
3 More recently a similar view to mine has been defended by Ferejohn (2013: 105-106) and 
Tierney (2001: 151 n.8). Bronstein (2016) is closer to Ross, arguing that efficient and final 
causation can be part of formal causation.
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A distinguishing feature of my work (in contrast especially to Ferejohn 2013), is 
that I show that Aristotle had very detailed procedures for identifying the formal 
cause, and that he was aware of several problems which might lead one to erro-
neously identify the wrong form as the cause. This result is important, making 
it evident that Aristotle’s theory has great potential for application in scientific 
practice today.4
Section 1 gives several non-conclusive indications pointing towards my thesis. 
Section 2 describes, from APo I, the syllogistic structure of demonstrations, and 
the criteria put on the fact that (ὅτι) and the reason why (διότι). Section 3 defends 
Aristotle’s doctrine of the primary universal (πρῶτον καθόλου). Section 4 pre-
sents Aristotle’s procedures and methods for identifying the formal cause (and 
also the material cause), from II 13-18. The last section adapts Aristotle’s theory, 
as hinted at in II 11-12, to demonstrations of efficient and final causation.
1 – Non-conclusive indications
1.1 – The four causes in APo II 11
Prima facie the discussion in II 11 seems the most relevant, as this is the chapter 
of APo where Aristotle discusses the four causes (αἰτία), while the causes are 
scarcely mentioned elsewhere in APo. However, read in isolation the chapter 
is highly deceptive, not only about the relation between the four causes and 
scientific demonstrations, but also about the nature of the four causes. Let us 
briefly, due to limited space passing over much excellent discussion of II 11 in 
the literature, go through each of the four causes in turn.
First, while Aristotle mentions all four causes in II 11, all he says there on the 
formal cause (or rather, essence) is: “The middle term has also been proved to 
be explanatory of what it is to be something.” (94a35-36)5
Second, what is sometimes taken to be the material cause seems to fit poorly 
with what Aristotle says elsewhere. Rather, he presents something like a ma-
4 There are very strong similarities between Aristotle’s theory in APo and Basic Formal 
Ontology (BFO), a foundational ontology now used by more than a hundred projects in 
applied ontology (cf. Arp/Smith/Spear 2015). However, I will not in this paper be making 
many references to BFO.
5 Throughout I use the translation, occasionally slightly modified, of Barnes (1993).
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terial conditional (→): if the middle term holds, then the conclusion holds. In 
some cases, the middle term will be the formal cause (94a34-35), but the materi-
al conditional also holds when the explanation is reversed (it also follows  from 
there being an eclipse that the earth is in the middle, but it is the latter that is 
the explanation of the former, cf. II 16). Thus, Aristotle presents the notion of a 
necessary condition – he does not introduce a demonstration involving matter 
as the cause.
Third, the efficient cause seems to order events, i.e. the efficient cause is the 
middle term and the events of the major and minor premise precede the con-
clusion. But this fits poorly with the stress on universals in the rest of the work. 
Not only because events are not universals as they are ordered in time, but also 
because the example he gives (i.e. Persians attacking the Athenians because the 
Athenians attacked Sardis) is contingent. Further, Aristotle is throughout his 
works hostile towards Humean event-causation.
Fourth, the final cause, when read using the rest of the doctrine in APo, seems 
prima facie to be terribly confused. Aristotle says that the middle term is the 
cause, but the final cause seems to be given as the minor term (viz. healthy), and 
the middle term is “the foodstuffs not remaining on the surface”.
My point is that Aristotle does not discuss the formal cause in II 11 because it is 
discussed throughout the rest of APo, and in this chapter Aristotle argues that 
his theory can be adapted (with some modification) to the other three causes. 
Commenting on II 11, Ross puts the point thus:
It is not that the middle term in a demonstration is sometimes the formal cause of 
the major term, sometimes its ground, sometimes its efficient cause, sometimes 
its final cause. It is always its formal cause (or definition), or rather an element 
in its formal cause; but this element is in some cases an eternal ground of the 
consequent (viz. when the consequence is itself an eternal fact), in some cases an 
efficient or a final cause (when the consequence is an event) [...] (Ross 1949: 640)
I would not put it exactly this way. Rather, the efficient and final cause, as de-
picted in II 11, do not fit with the doctrine presented in the rest of APo because 
they were never meant to fit with it. The general doctrine concerns the formal 
cause. That is the case which he is elaborating upon throughout the rest of the 
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work, and in this chapter he merely indicates how it can be adapted to the other 
three causes. However, elsewhere in APo Aristotle discusses different notions of 
material and efficient causation, where the middle term is matter (e.g., bronze) 
or a process (e.g., solidification of the sap).6 For these two cases, adaptation of 
Aristotle’s theory of formal causation needs only minor changes (cf. section 5), 
and thus one is able to make more sense out of II 11.
1.2 – Aristotle’s preferred choice of examples
Amongst Aristotle’s examples in APo, the most frequently used are very definite-
ly formal causes, especially his geometrical7 examples:
· Isosceles8 has 2R internal angles because of Triangle (e.g., 73b38-39)
· Isosceles has 4R external angles because of Rectilineal figure (e.g., 85b38-
86a3)
· An animal has manyplies and lack upper incisors because Horn-bearer 
(98a17-19)
· A plant sheds its leaves because of Broad-leaved (e.g., 98a37-98b4)
Notably, there is great variety in Aristotle’s cases, although most are only men-
tioned once or twice. However, amongst these there are clear examples of effi-
cient causation:
· Broad-leaved plants shed leaves because of solidification of the sap (e.g., 
98b36-38)
· The moon is eclipsed because the light leaves it when the earth screens it 
(e.g., 98a37-98b4)
1.3 – Aristotle’s discussion of definition in APo II 1-10 & 13
If Aristotle is primarily concerned about formal causation then his detailed dis-
cussion of definition, division, and its relation to demonstration (II 1-10 & 13) 
makes perfect sense. Aristotle holds that a real definition states the essence of a 
form. And division concerns forms. Rather than being seen as a lengthy detour 
away from the main topic, these chapters can be seen as intricately connected 
6 Thanks again to Robert Bolton & James G. Lennox.
7 That the geometrical cases are very frequent in the APo, and that these are cases of formal 
causation, I take to be widely accepted. A recent case: ”Aristotle recognized four types of 
cause [...] In the APo he focuses on the formal cause [...]” (Bronstein 2016: 35 n. 23.)
8 Universals are throughout indicated by capital first letter and italics.
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to the rest of the work. This is also inconclusive, as there are other possible ac-
counts of these chapters (e.g., Charles 2000; Bronstein 2016).
2 – The syllogistic structure of demonstrations
The general structure of a demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) by formal cause is as fol-
lows. Aristotle applies his theory of the syllogism from the Prior Analytics, how-
ever for demonstrations he requires that premises and conclusions be universal 
and affirmative, viz. has the modus Barbara (cf. APo I 14-15 & 24-26). In the Prior 
Analytics this is an inference from the premises to the conclusion:
S is M
M is P
                                therefore
S is P
In contrast, in a demonstration the conclusion precedes the premises (cf. 87a17-
19). Aristotle says that by nature the middle term and the premises are prior to 
the conclusion (APo I 26, 87a17-19), while the conclusion is to us. One begins 
with the conclusion (S is P), namely the fact to be explained (ὅτι), the explanan-
dum. Next one finds the explanation and cause of the fact (διότι), the explanans. 
This is the middle term, ‘M’, which connects ‘S’ with ‘P’. The demonstration is 
read (e.g., 81b10-11):
S is P
                                because
S is M
M is P
Or alternatively the demonstration can be abbreviated through the application 
of the modifier qua (ᾗ): S is P qua M. By the rules of the syllogism one can check 
that the constructed figure (Barbara) is valid, and thus that the middle term in 
fact connects the major and minor. This is the benefit that the application of the 
syllogism provides. It is not used for drawing inferences, but rather for ensuring 
consistency.
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The terms of a syllogism are logical variables, which can be replaced by either 
particulars or universals. By contrast, in a demonstration the variables can only 
be replaced by universals (including universals only instantiated by a single 
thing, e.g., the moon). Because of this I will, following Aristotle, quite inno-
cently speak of the subject-, predicate-, and middle-term throughout this paper, 
when what I actually mean is the universal which replaces the term-variable in 
a demonstration.
That particulars cannot feature in (ideal) demonstrations is sometimes rejected 
in the literature, but is evident from his discussion of the case that “Coriscus is 
musical” (APo I 24, 85a25-27). This is not a particularly quantified proposition 
(viz. some S is P), but rather a proposition involving a particular, viz. Coriscus. 
Aristotle concludes in I 24 that it is better to know that Triangle has 2R, than it is 
to know that some geometrical figure has 2R, or than it is to know that Isosceles 
has 2R, or than it is to know that the figure I just drew has 2R. And this should be 
unsurprising, since science is generally held to be primarily about generaliza-
tions and generic laws, and only secondarily about certain particulars to which 
these generalizations are applicable (cf. Arp/Smith/Spear 2015: 12-13). However, 
Aristotle does hold that a scientific demonstration is applicable to particulars 
(e.g., Coriscus, qua Man).
Second, Aristotle puts strong criteria on the fact that. Especially relevant is that 
neither of the terms be incidental, but that they must be necessary or for the 
most part (I 6, 19, & 30; II 12). This excludes both cases like “that man is white”, 
because Whiteness is incidental to Man; but also “that white thing has two legs” 
because “that white thing” is incidental in that it fails to pick out something 
necessary (i.e. it excludes what is sometimes called unnatural predications). 
This implies that Aristotle requires the minor term to be a substantial universal 
(e.g., Man, Isosceles) and the major term a non-substantial universal that is not 
accidental (e.g., Two-legged, 2R).
Third, the criteria for the reason why are principally given in I 4-5. The formal 
cause must be universal (καθόλου), viz. it must belong (1) to all (κατὰ παντὸς), 
(2) per se (καθ’ αὑτὸ), and (3) qua itself (ᾗ αὑτὸ) (cf. APo I 4, 73b25-7). All three 
of these conditions are sometimes misunderstood in the secondary literature 
(e.g., in Ferejohn 2013; cf. Sandstad forthcoming). (1) to all (κατὰ παντὸς); this 
requirement is a general guideline, and is an important step in the procedure 
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for finding formal causes, but importantly it does allow for exceptions. E.g., the 
blind mole which lacks the essential (qua footed vivipara) property of sight (cf. 
Sandstad 2016). (2) per se (καθ’ αὑτὸ); contrary to Ferejohn (2013: 83-95) this is 
not a requirement of analyticity. Rather, it requires that the attribute should be-
long essentially and not accidentally to the form. (3) qua (ᾗ αὑτὸ); this require-
ment says that the intensional context of the attribute is the given form, even 
when one is not primarily speaking about that form, but rather e.g., its species 
(cf. Lennox 2014b). It cannot be merely extensional, as is evident from the dis-
cussion of the possibility of separate explanations for the same thing in APo 
II 17, 99a1-99b6 (cf. section 4.3). To summarize, a purely extensional reading 
(viz. every instance of A is B) should be rejected in favour of a non-extensional 
reading (viz. the universal A is B). The copula is a transitive (and, following Ma-
link 2009, reflexive) relation. Examples of such relations are “Man is an Animal” 
(species to genus), or “Solidifying of the sap is part of Shedding of leaves” (part 
to whole).9 We will see in section 4 that Aristotle makes use of the extensional 
reading in his procedures for identifying the formal cause, i.e. he uses the first 
criteria. However, the resulting demonstration uses the intensional reading.
3 – The doctrine of the primary universal
Against Barnes, one of the main authors responsible for the dismissal of the 
view that I am defending, I defend the doctrine of the primary universal (πρῶτον 
καθόλου), viz. the commensurate universal. Barnes (1993: 258f.) rejects the pres-
ence of this doctrine in APo, but his arguments are all based upon the misunder-
standing that the doctrine requires the terms of a demonstration to be convert-
ible. Actually, the doctrine says that the middle term is the primary universal, 
viz. the universal that satisfies all the three criteria. Further, the primary univer-
sal is commensurate with the major term; viz. Triangle is commensurate with 
2R. For two universals (Triangle and 2R) to be commensurate it is required that 
everything that has 2R is a Triangle, and that every Triangle has 2R. This means 
that the predicate term either is a part of the essence (and thus the definition) 
of the primary universal, or that it follows from the essence as a proprium of the 
primary universal. For some reason Barnes refuses to accept the case of pro-
pria, but 2R is certainly a proprium of Triangle. He, and Ferejohn (2013), seem 
9 Pace Corkum (2015), I do not want to assimilate all such relations to that of parthood, as 
this would introduce unwarranted equivocity.
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to be under the misconception that commensurability is the same as analytic-
ity, and thus requires intersubstitutability salva veritate (“definitions convert: 
hence some premisses of some demonstrations will deal with commensurate 
universals.”; Barnes 1993: 259). Aristotle allows for this between a species and 
its definition, viz. its genus and differentia. Therefore Barnes wants to restrict 
the doctrine to the differentia, and to exclude the propria. But there seems to be 
no ground for such exclusion.
Barnes in addition misreads II 16-17 as rejecting the doctrine. But the conclusion 
is clear: “Thus it is possible for there to be several explanations of the same 
feature—but not for items of the same form.” (99b4-5) Aristotle does not reject 
the doctrine; rather he presents an important addition. The primary universal 
is commensurate with the major term within the relevant division of kinds (and 
studied by a specific science), as presented in II 13-14. E.g., Rationality (λόγος) 
is commensurate with Man. This is in no way contradicted by the case of the 
unmoved mover also having Rationality, because the unmoved mover does not 
share any form with Man, they are studied by separate sciences, and belong to 
separate taxonomies. A similar argument can be given for the wings of birds, 
insects, and the bat (cf. Sandstad 2016). To conclude, the doctrine is in no way 
refuted by Barnes’ arguments.
4 – Aristotle’s methods for finding the formal cause in II 13-18
I will elucidate Aristotle’s methods and procedures for finding the primary uni-
versal in II 13-18, elaborating on work by Lennox. However, where Lennox argues 
that Aristotle does not give procedures for identifying causes in APo (Lennox 
2014a: 33), I argue that Aristotle presents two generic procedures for identify-
ing causes. I will assume that the inquirer already has composed a preliminary 
taxonomy for the science, including stating the axioms i.e. the summa genera of 
the taxonomy, and defining each substantial universal (excluding the axioms) 
in terms of genus and differentia (cf. II 1-10, summarized at the beginning of II 
13). Basically, this procedure will be the construction of what is today called a 
domain ontology (cf. Arp/Smith/Spear 2015). In II 13-18 Aristotle presents sever-
al methods and procedures for discovering formal causes, thus continuing the 
discussion from II 1-10.
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4.1 – The basic procedure (II 13)
Closely related to the requirement of belonging to all (κατὰ παντὸς), Aristotle 
introduces the rule that “the essence of something is the last such predication to 
hold of the atoms.” (96b12-13) This refers back to the procedure given especially 
in I 5 and I 24, where one proceeds from the  infimae species, e.g., Isosceles, 
and then proceeds to the highest genus where all members also have the given 
attribute. E.g., one proceeds from Isosceles having 2R, and then examines its 
genus Triangle, finding that it also have 2R, and then examines its genus again, 
Figure or Limit and finds that it does not have 2R.10 From this one can conclude 
that 2R essentially belongs to Triangle.
This basic procedure can be illustrated by a chart, and is applicable to the 
demonstration of any formal cause. One starts with the input, which is the fact 
that. First one checks that all S are in fact P, and in case they are not, then the 
fact that fails a basic criterion and must be restated. The next step is to check if 
the next immediate genus S’ is also such that all of its instances have P. If not, 
then S is the formal cause. While if there is such a genus, then you need to check 
if it, in turn, has a genus S’’ such that all of its instances have P. If not, then S’ is 
the formal cause.  If it is, then you again check if there is a genus S’’’, etc.
10 Barnes (1993: 125) mistakenly reverses the direction in his discussion of APo I 5, interpret-
ing it as proceeding from the summa genera.
Aristotle’s basic procedure to 
determine the formal cause
Diagram with Niels Grewe &  
Ludger Jansen
S* := S‘
S* := S S, P
Start
S is P qua S*
 genus S‘ of
S*: all S‘ is
P?
Yes
Yes No
No
Not all S are PAre all S*
P?
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This procedure can be extended to material causation. Then one begins not 
with the species, but instead with the matter. One first asks whether bronzen 
isosceles triangles have 2R. In this example the matter is irrelevant. However, if 
the fact that is bronze isosceles triangles having melting point of about 950 °C, 
then the reason why will be Bronze, a material cause.11 Thus in cases where there 
might be a material cause, one begins the basic procedure with the matter. And 
if it holds for the matter, but for none of the forms, then the matter will be the 
reason why. However, Aristotle seems to mention ‘bronze’ merely as a point on 
the side (74a40-74b1), rather than as a fully worked out theory. And, as already 
mentioned, Aristotle seems innocent of the distinction between matter and 
form in APo. However this mere mention is sufficient to disprove Ross’ sugges-
tion that Aristotle realized “that he could not work the material cause into his 
thesis that the cause is the middle term” (Ross 1949: 639). Presumably, had Ar-
istotle fully worked out a theory of material causation in the APo, then he would 
have realized that matter can be more or less determinate, and come in different 
granularities. A property might be materially caused by being bronzen, or by 
being an alloy (if it holds for all alloys, and not just bronze). Likewise, rather 
than being materially caused by being bronzen, it might be materially caused 
by e.g., the copper constituent of the bronze. Thus, talking about the matter is 
a simplification, and an account of material causation would have to apply the 
basic procedure to identify the correct determinate and granular level of matter.
This also raises the question of how demonstrations can be made at the level 
of parts of substances, rather than at substances. To clarify, these would be 
demonstrations where the subject term and the middle term are parts of sub-
stances, rather than substances. Elsewhere (Partibus Animalium I 1, 640b17-28), 
Aristotle makes the distinction between uniform parts (e.g., flesh, bone, blood) 
and non-uniform parts (e.g., face, hand, foot). One would perhaps be more in-
clined to view uniform parts as matter (Socrates consists of flesh, bone, and 
blood) since they are mass terms, and non-uniform parts as form (Socrates has 
a face, a hand, a foot) since they are count terms. In either case, it is of little sig-
nificance whether we call demonstrations involving parts material or formal.
11 This view seems to be quite similar to the reading of Barnes (1993: 226-227). Of course, for 
the process of Melting there will also be the efficient cause Heat.
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4.2 – The top-down procedure of excerpting
II 14 gives a procedure of discovering formal causes through a top-down approach, 
“by supposing the kind common to all the items and excerpting [ἐκλέγειν].” 
(98a2-3) Whereas the basic procedure begins with the infimae species, this top-
down procedure instead begins with the summa genera.  E.g., if the science is 
zoology, then on this method one begins with the genus Animal, in contrast to 
the basic procedure which would begin with e.g., Hawk. A further difference is 
that the basic procedure is used to identify only a single formal cause of a single 
property at a time. While the top-down procedure, through executing the proce-
dure once, can identify several formal causes for several properties.
The top-down procedure works as follows. The zoologist first makes a list of 
all those properties studied in zoology (including variations in granularity and 
more or less determinate). To this list there corresponds a set, call it Set I, viz. 
{P1, P2, P3, P4, P5 ...}. Further, one presupposes a preliminary taxonomy, with one 
or more summa genera, e.g., Animal. This is the input, viz. the starting point, of 
the procedure.
The next step is to check, separately, for each of the properties from Set I, wheth-
er every member of the summum genus has the property. That means, whether 
every animal has P1, and whether every animal has P2, etc. For each of these 
properties, if the answer is affirmative, then Animal is its formal cause.
The third step is to construct a new set, call this Set II; such that it contains all 
those members of Set I which does not have Animal as formal cause. In other 
words, for all those cases where the answer was affirmative in the previous step 
the property is excerpted (viz. removed or pulled out) from the original list of 
properties. Thus Set II might end up as {P1, P4, P5 ...}. And the relative comple-
ment of Set II with respect to Set I, viz. {P2, P3, ...}, will be the set of the excerpted 
properties of which Animal is the formal cause.
The fourth step is similar to the second step, with the difference that it uses Set 
II instead of Set I, and it uses the immediate species of the summum genus, e.g., 
Bird and Fish. Note that all co-ordinate species (i.e. they have the same imme-
diate genus) make use of the same set of properties. Thus, one asks separate-
ly for each of the properties, and for each of the co-ordinate species, whether 
every member of a species has the property. E.g., whether every bird has P1, and 
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whether every bird has P4, etc. And whether every fish has P1, and whether every 
fish has P4, etc.
The fifth step is similar to the third step, only here we will have two sets of prop-
erties. One, Set III {P1, P4, ...}, for those where one has excerpted those properties 
which have Bird as the formal cause. Another, Set IV{P1, P5 ...}, for those where 
one has excerpted those properties which have Fish as the formal cause.
The next step will follow the familiar practice. On one hand, one will investi-
gate for each immediate species of Bird, using the properties in Set III, whether 
every member of one of the co-ordinate species has any of the properties. E.g., 
assume for simplicity that Duck and Hawk are the only co-ordinate species of 
Bird. Then check whether every duck has P1, whether every duck has P4, etc. 
And whether every hawk has P1, whether every hawk has P4, etc. On the other 
hand, one will similarly investigate for each immediate species of Fish, using 
the properties in Set IV.
Finally, having performed the procedure all the way down to the infimae spe-
cies, one will have identified the formal cause for many properties. Some of the 
properties will have several formal causes, namely where there are separate for-
mal causes in separate branches of the taxonomy. Presumably there will also 
be some properties from the original list, Set I, for which no formal cause is 
identified, viz. some properties may not have been excerpted at any step of the 
procedure. Perhaps there is no formal cause for these properties, i.e. they are 
accidental. Or perhaps there is an unknown formal cause.
4.3 – Fallibilism: unknown forms, analogy, equivocation, and exceptions
Both the basic procedure and the top-down procedure have one serious draw-
back: they presuppose that we have a complete and true taxonomy of the sci-
ence. Specifically, there might be an unknown form. This unknown form G1 
could be mediate between two others, such that it is the immediate genus of a 
species S, and the genus G2 which we thought was the immediate genus of S is 
in fact the immediate genus of G1. In this case, perhaps G1, instead of S or G2, is 
the relevant formal cause for our demonstration.
Aristotle is aware of this drawback in II 14-18. And at several places he seems to 
indicate some principle of fallibilism, more precisely he is open to cases of false 
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(though truthlike) scientific demonstrations. Through revisions of the taxonomy 
one can come to correct one’s scientific demonstrations. He gives at least four 
lines of inquiry by which one can arrive at revisions:
4.3.1 – Unknown forms: In cases where several species of the same genus has 
a property, but separately and not because of the genus, check if there is an ex-
planatory mediate genus
II 14 (98a13-19) concerns cases where there is no common name for the sub-
stantial universal. One starts with an attribute that seems to be shared among 
several forms. But if these forms can be joined by a common genus, thus mod-
ifying the taxonomy, then this common genus is the formal cause. E.g., having 
manyplies and lacking upper incisors follow from being a Horn-bearer.
But it might also be that there is no common genus, and in II 16-17 Aristotle dis-
cusses the possibility of an attribute having several primary universals. Related, 
II 15 discusses cases where an attribute can be explained first on one level, then 
a genus (or determinable) of that attribute can be explained at another level 
(e.g., echo, mirror, and rainbow are all types of reflection). Or one attribute can 
have a mediate and an immediate cause (e.g., end of month being more stormy, 
and this because the moon is waning). Aristotle seems to reject a reduction 
of one to the other. Instead he says that in these cases there are two separate, 
though related, problems; each with separate, though related, causes. However, 
in II 18 he argues that one of them can be more primary (cf. 4.3.4). In either case, 
one should investigate if there might be a hidden common genus.
An unknown mediating 
genus G1 could be the 
genuine formal cause:
S
G2
G1
Immediate
Mediate
Immediate
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4.3.2 – Analogy: In analogous cases, check if there is a common genus
In analogous cases (II 14, 98a20-23) we do not have good enough evidence for 
there being a common genus. But for each of the analogous species one should 
compare them and see if they also share further attributes. In the end this might 
yield sufficient evidence for a common genus. E.g., the analogous properties 
pounce, spine, and bone.
4.3.3 – Equivocation: Replace any equivocal terms with unequivocal terms
Equivocation (viz. homonymy) is an obvious fallacy, as also use of metaphorical 
language (II 13, 75b14-39; II 17, 99a6-15). If the subject- or predicate-term is equiv-
ocal, metaphorical, or analogous, then there will not be a single reason why; 
and thus the middle-term will also be equivocal, metaphorical, or analogous.
4.3.4 – Exceptions: In cases where a property is demonstrated both at a higher 
genus and a lower species (e.g., the blind mole), the lower species is the primary 
cause
II 18 discusses a problematic case, where the attribute has different formal causes 
depending on the granularity of the attribute (partly paralleling II 15). Aristotle 
gives only a schematic example, and interpretation is difficult. Aristotle is asking 
the question; which formal cause explains why the particular has the attribute? 
Aristotle answers that it is the closest to the particular, i.e. the most determinate 
attribute and its corresponding formal cause. My example would be the blind 
mole, in which case the problem is; why does the blind mole have underdevel-
oped eyes under its skin? The blind mole is a footed vivipara, and therefore it has 
eyes (viz. Footed Vivipara is the formal cause of having eyes). But there is a more 
determinate explanation: the blind mole is a species of Mole lacking sight, or more 
precisely, having underdeveloped eyes under the skin, and this property has the 
more specific formal cause Blind mole. Through this rule Aristotle is able to deal 
with exceptions. The rule says that when there are several formal causes of the 
attribute, then the most determinate formal cause overrides the less determinate.12
12 In Sandstad (2016) I further connect this with Aristotle’s view of embryological develop-
ment, as proceeding from the more general to the more specific according to von Baer’s 
law (which Aristotle recognized).
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In addition to those discussed here in section 4, there are of course many more 
rules specific to each science (e.g., to biology as given in Partibus Animalium I 1, 
cf. Lennox 2014a: 33).
5 – Efficient and final causation as process universals
We have seen that Aristotle’s discussion in II 11, where efficient causation seems 
to be a type of Humean event-causation, fits poorly with the rest of APo. Howev-
er, Aristotle usually defends a non-Humean type of causation. Events are often 
identified in terms of their time and location, and as something which happens 
between various substances. Since the term “event” is associated with Humean 
event-causation, I instead use the term “process” which, hopefully, will not have 
these connotations. In contrast to Humean events, processes are changes occur-
ring in a substance, and are identified by the substance they depend upon, and 
the kind of change the substance undergoes at that time – i.e. a process is defined 
in terms its start- and end-states.13 Further, as argued in the Physics and Meta-
physics Θ, the beginning of the process involves the actualization of two powers 
(viz. dispositional properties), one passive and one active (where the active power 
often belongs to a separate substance). A process has temporal parts (in contrast 
to substances, on an Aristotelian view), and is ontologically dependent upon the 
substances in which it occurs. But one can also speak about kinds of processes, 
i.e. of process universals. In contrast to particular events (like Athens attacking 
Sardis), process universals satisfy Aristotle’s criteria for scientific demonstrations.
For example from APo II 16-17: Broad-leaved trees have Shedding of leaves be-
cause of Solidifying of sap. Contrast this demonstration of the efficient cause 
with the corresponding demonstration of the formal cause: Trees has Shedding 
of leaves because of Broad-leaved. In the case of the formal cause, the middle 
term is a form, and the predicate term is perhaps most naturally read as a power 
possessed by trees. In contrast, in the case of the efficient cause both the middle 
term and the predicate term are most naturally read as processes occurring in 
trees. Thus, even though the two seem to give distinct reasons why to the iden-
tical fact that, as it turns out there are two distinct facts that: the one involving 
efficient causation has a process as the predicate term, while the one involving 
13 Hennig (2009) also argues that efficient and final causation concerns processes. However, 
his account differs in several other ways from mine.
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formal causation has a power as the predicate term. These are closely related, 
in that the power is what makes the substance capable of undergoing a certain 
type of change (i.e. to have the process occurring in the substance).
Further, the formal cause will feature as the subject-term of a demonstration 
of efficient (or final) cause. Thus one goes from a formal demonstration where 
a form is the middle term, and the middle term defines the subject term (what 
Lennox calls an A-type explanation); to an efficient demonstration where the 
form is the subject term while a process is the middle term, and the middle term 
defines the predicate term (a type of what Lennox calls a B-type explanation), cf. 
Lennox (2001: 10 & 2014a: 32).
The next crucial question is how the two process universals are related to each 
other, such that the middle term is the efficient cause of the predicate term. Ar-
istotle’ discussion of this in II 16-17, and more in-depth in II 11-12, is far from 
clear. What is clear is that Solidifying of sap takes place earlier than Shedding of 
leaves. And conversely for final causation, the final cause takes place last. Aris-
totle notes this difference between final and efficient in II 11:
Here [sc. in final causation] the process of change [γενέσεις]14 occur in the opposite 
order compared to explanations in terms of change [sc. in efficient causation]: 
there the middle term must occur first; here C, the last term, occurs first, and the 
ultimate thing to occur is the purpose. (APo II 11, 94b23-26)
Now, taking first efficient causation, this is consistent either (1) with the two being 
distinct processes, and where the change which is the result of the first process 
is a condition of the second process occurring, or (2) with the first process being 
a part of the second process.15 The difficulty with the first position is that trees 
14 Barnes (1993) translates it as “event”. The neutral way to translate γενέσεις would be as 
“becoming”. Here I translate it as “process of change”, which I take to be a paraphrase of 
becoming. In the Physics, κίνησις is often best translated as process, however κίνησις does 
not appear in APo.
15 Lennox (2001) is neutral on this point. At one point he seems to express the first option: 
“Shedding leaves is a process resulting from a more basic process of solidification.” (Len-
nox 2001: 13). But at the end of that paragraph he says something like the second option: 
“For this causally basic process is both what shedding is, and the cause of certain plants 
shedding their leaves.” (Ibid.)
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can shed their leaves because an animal is pulling off the leaves, so it cannot be 
a necessary condition. Nor is it a sufficient condition, since often a further condi-
tion is necessary, e.g., a strong wind. In these regards, the second position seems 
preferable. Commenting on II 12, 95b1-12, Apostle suggests something like this:
Perhaps Aristotle is considering relations among outcomes or stages in a chang-
ing thing, as in the case of a continuous development or motion of that thing. One 
may wonder, for example, what kind of analysis would explain the way in which 
one part of a change leads to (or perhaps causes, as some think) another, or how 
the parts are held together to constitute a single change. (Apostle 1981: 262)
I suggest that the notion of parthood is exactly what Aristotle needs in order to 
adapt his account to efficient and final causation. Especially, parthood is what 
is required to ensure simultaneity of terms, which is a criterion that Aristotle 
defends in APo II 12. To take an example, the process of (natural) Shedding of 
leaves involves a subsidiary process, which happens at the beginning of the pri-
mary process, viz. Solidifying of sap. And this subsidiary process is the efficient 
cause of Shedding of leaves because it is the earliest part of the process of Shed-
ding of leaves, and Solidifying of sap is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
Shedding of leaves.
If it is because of solidification of the moisture, then if a tree sheds its leaves solid-
ification must hold, and if solidification holds—not of anything whatever but of a 
tree—then the tree must shed its leaves. (APo II 16, 98b36-38)
The process of solidification is here identified as a change in trees, later spec-
ified as “of the sap at the connection of the seed” (99a29). Any earlier subsidi-
ary process cannot be the efficient cause, since a process might consist of many 
subsidiary processes. Aristotle here adds that the subsidiary process must be 
a necessary and sufficient condition for the completion of the total process. In 
syllogistic structure:
Broad-leaved trees (S) undergo Shedding of leaves (P)
        because
Broad-leaved trees (S) undergo Solidifying of the sap (M)
Solidifying of the sap (M) is part of Shedding of leaves (P)
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How would one identify the efficient cause, in this case solidifying of the sap, 
using Aristotle’s two procedures? In the case of formal and material causation, 
the two procedures presuppose a taxonomy of genera and species, and the rela-
tion which the procedures make use of is that where A, e.g., Animal, is a genus 
of B, e.g., Man – or conversely where B is a species of A. For efficient and final 
causation we instead use the relation where C, e.g., Solidifying of the sap, is a 
part of D, e.g., Shedding of leaves – or conversely D has a part C.
Normally, a process will consist of several sub-processes (e.g., yellowing of 
leaves, reddening of leaves, browning of leaves.) In efficient causation you are 
looking for the earliest part (or state) of the process Shedding of leaves (viz. the 
predicate process). Thus the sub-processes are distinguished by the position 
they hold in that process. The efficient cause is the process that is the earliest 
process that is a part of the predicate process; and is such that if you go to the 
process that is immediately earlier, then that process is not a part of the predi-
cate process. The procedure for identifying the efficient cause would thus be a 
variant of the basic procedure. And for final causation the procedure would be 
the same, with the difference that the final cause is the final part of the process – 
namely the end result or state, that which it is a change into, or more technically 
it is the end limit (πέρας, cf. Metaphysics Δ 17 and De Motu Animalium 6, 700b14-
16) of the  predicate process. For example (based loosely upon 95b32-36):
Stone foundation (S) participates in House construction (P)
        because
Stone foundation (S) participates in House (M)
House (M) is part of House construction (P)
This example highlights a prima facie problem with Aristotle’s account of effi-
cient and final causes: it is circular. House construction is defined as a change 
from its beginning state, the laying of the foundation (the efficient cause), to 
its end state, the finished house (the final cause). Yet, in order to identify the 
efficient and final cause we must first know the predicate process House con-
struction. Thus we have a vicious circle; one must first know the reason why 
in order to know the fact that, and one must first know the fact that in order to 
know the reason why. This prima facie circularity is not merely a fault of my 
interpretation, as Aristotle himself seems committed to it in APo II 8-10. The 
apparent circularity can be solved if one, following inter alia Charles (2000) and 
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Bronstein (2016), makes the distinction between a preliminary definition and a 
real definition. For instance, one could give a preliminary definition of Shed-
ding of leaves as a change from slightly yellow leaves to the leaves falling off. 
After which one could identify the efficient cause of Shedding of leaves, namely 
Solidifying of the sap.
6 – Conclusion
All four variants of scientific demonstration, from the paradigmatic formal 
causation to the other three, can be represented as follows:
Subject-term Predicate-term Middle-term
Formal cause Substance Attribute Form
Material cause Substance Attribute Matter
Efficient cause Substance, often a 
formal or material 
cause
Process Process, which is the 
first part of the pred-
icate process
Final cause Substance, often a 
formal or material 
cause
Process Process, which is 
the final part of the 
predicate process
I hope to have shown that much of Aristotle’s discussion first and foremost con-
cerns formal causation. I have further shown that Aristotle had very detailed 
procedures for identifying the formal cause, and that he was aware of several 
problems which might lead one to erroneously identify the wrong form as the 
cause. Finally, I have shown that Aristotle’s account can indeed be adapted to 
material causation, and through some modifications, hinted at in APo II 11-12 
& 16-17, also to efficient and final causation. Indeed, my reading of these two 
chapters supports my hypothesis that the rest of the APo is primarily concerned 
with formal causation.16
16 I am grateful to James G. Lennox, Ludger Jansen, Niels Grewe, and Georg Füllen for very 
helpful comments, (highly) critical remarks, and discussion. I also want to thank the audi-
ence at Maribor and Thessaloniki where an earlier version of this paper was presented.
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